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Actionable damage in negligence 
As a matter of common law principle, a duty of care normally is owed where a person by negligence 
causes personal injury to another.1 Indeed, the primary function of the negligence action overseas is 
to provide compensation to victims in personal injury cases, but in New Zealand, of course, these 
claims are nearly always barred and the victim’s remedy is to make a claim for accident 
compensation. But accident compensation cover for mental injury is limited, and the common law 
remains applicable in this case. As for claims for financial loss, the law is a good deal more uncertain, 
and whether a duty ought to be imposed frequently arouses controversy. 
Physical injury 
Sometimes a question can arise as to whether personal injury by way of actual physical injury has 
been suffered. A leading authority is Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd.2 The claimants were 
negligently exposed by their employers to asbestos dust, putting them at risk of developing one or 
more long-term asbestos related diseases. They had not in fact contracted such diseases, but their 
exposure had caused them to develop pleural plaques - localised areas of pleural thickening. These 
plaques had no adverse effect on any bodily function and did not themselves have the propensity to 
develop into an asbestos related disease, but the claimants argued that physical changes to the body 
coupled with the risk of future injury from exposure to asbestos which caused consequent anxiety 
could found a claim for negligence. However, the House of Lords rejected their argument. Lord 
Hoffmann said the important point was that, save in the most exceptional case, the plaques would 
never cause any symptoms, did not increase the susceptibility of the claimants to other diseases and 
did not shorten their expectation of life. They had no effect on their health at all. So they were not 
damage. This being so, his Lordship asked whether they became damage when aggregated with the 
risk which they evidenced or the anxiety which that risk caused. Yet neither head was independently 
actionable, and they could not be relied on to create a cause of action which would not otherwise 
exist. 
A recent instance applying the Rothwell principle is Greenway v Johnson Matthey plc.3 In this case 
the claimants were employed by the defendants at chemical plants where they were negligently 
exposed to platinum salts and sensitised to a full blown platinum allergy. The Court of Appeal held 
that they could not claim in respect of personal injury in circumstances where no allergy had 
developed and their condition was and would remain symptomless. Platinum sensitisation was no 
more than a physiological change and was not harmful in itself. It was not a hidden impairment with 
the potential to give rise to detrimental physical effects in ordinary life. The claimants simply had to 
avoid further exposure to platinum.  
Economic injury 
 
1 An example where it may not is a claim for negligence in respect of acts and omissions on the part of those 
engaged in armed combat: Shaw Savill & Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344; Mulcahy v 
Ministry of Defence [1966] QB 732; Multiple Claimants v The Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 1134; but 
compare Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52. 
2 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281. 
3 Greenway v Johnson Matthey plc 2016] EWCA Civ 408, [2016] 1 WLR 4487 
However, some employees had been redeployed, dismissed or resigned, and they alleged that the 
defendants were liable for breach of contract, breach of statutory duty and negligence in causing 
them to lose relatively well-paid employment. On this question the court held that the classic 
formulation of duty focused on protection from physical injury, not economic harm. There could be 
no implied term protecting the employees against economic harm, and no contractual duty 
protecting them against the financial consequences of losing their jobs beyond their ordinary rights 
under their contracts. The nexus between the parties was founded on contract, and this was the 
primary source for their rights and obligations. A duty of care might run in parallel with the 
defendants’ contractual duties, but the principles of tort would not impose on the defendants a 
more extensive obligation. So the defendants were under no duty to protect the claimants in 
relation to their financial losses. 
So far as New Zealand is concerned, the claimants seemingly would not have suffered “personal 
injury” for the purposes of the ACA 2001, defined in s 26(1) as meaning, inter alia, “physical injuries 
to the person”. Blanchard J has said that physical injuries are injuries suffered by the claimant which 
have some appreciable and not wholly transitory impact on the person but which are not necessarily 
long-lasting or ones that caused serious bodily harm.4 So any action in respect of platinum 
sensitisation at common law would not be barred, but would likely fail for the same reason as in 
Greenway, that it did not constitute an actionable injury. That leaves the question as to the loss in 
relation to the claimants’ employment, and Sales LJ ventured some general observations about 
recovering financial losses in negligence claims.5 His Lordship said that the appellants could be said 
to be just on the wrong side of a reasonably “bright line” rule according to which the threshold for 
liability was the infliction of physical injury. It was in the nature of bright line rules that some 
marginal cases fell close to the dividing line created by the rule yet failed to satisfy it. This did not 
lead to the conclusion in the present case that the existing clear rule should be modified. That would 
tend to undermine the virtue of having a bright line rule in the first place, whereby people could 
have a reasonably clear idea of how things stood when they planned their affairs and also a 
reasonably clear idea whether to embark on litigation and what their prospects of success might be. 
The law did not furnish a remedy for every harm suffered by an individual, and in particular did not 
do so where the infliction of the harm in question did not constitute a “wrong” in the contemplation 
of the law. 
Cases where economic loss standing alone is recoverable are those falling within the Hedley Byrne 
rule,6 and those where the courts have accepted that the circumstances are such that good 
considerations of policy support the claim.7 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro 
SpA8 is a recent decision declining to extend the ambit of the Hedley Byrne principle. The first 
claimant (a casino) wanted a financial reference from the defendant bank in respect of a customer. A 
request for the reference was made by the third claimant on the first claimant’s behalf, this to 
preserve customer confidentiality. The bank provided the reference to the third claimant, without 
 
4 Allenby v H [2012] NZSC 33, [2012] 3 NZLR 425 at [56]. 
5 Above n 3, at [55]. 
6 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
7 A leading example involving the weighing of competing considerations of policy is Customs and Excise 
Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181. 
8 Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2016] EWCA Civ 457, [2016] 1 WLR 3169. 
knowing its purpose, stating that the customer was financially healthy. In reality the customer was in 
the process of opening an account with the bank in which there were never any funds. The reference 
was reviewed by second claimant, which owned the first and third, after which a cheque cashing 
facility was made available to the customer. The first claimant subsequently made losses as a result 
of accepting the customer’s counterfeit cheques. The Court of Appeal held that since the party 
requesting the reference had been identified as the third claimant, and its true purpose had not 
been disclosed, the bank had not assumed a responsibility to the first claimant or been in a special 
relationship with that claimant. It was not fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty when the first 
claimant had deliberately concealed its own interest. 
The decision is another illustration of the tendency of the courts to caution in financial loss cases. 
More particularly, it shows the readiness of the courts to limit the Hedley Byrne duty strictly to cases 
where negligent information or advice is given by a defendant to a known claimant for a known 
purpose to be used for that purpose without independent inquiry. These requirements were indeed 
spelled out by Lord Oliver in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,9 and represent core controls on the 
ambit of the Hedley Byrne rule. 
Mental injury 
Leading decisions in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have seen claims for damages 
for mental injury as tending to raise a concern about opening the floodgates to litigation, although 
the courts’ determinations as to the seriousness of that concern and how it ought to be resolved 
have differed. In particular, in the UK the House of Lords has drawn a distinction between “primary” 
and “secondary” victims,10 and as regards the latter has adopted a multi-faceted proximity analysis 
for determining the duty issue, taking account of the causal, temporal and geographical proximity 
between the claimant and the happening of the accident and of the emotional proximity between 
the claimant and the primary victim.11 In New Zealand, a formal primary/secondary distinction has 
not been discussed or adopted, and as regards secondary victims the need for emotional proximity 
has been accepted but whether there is a need for temporal and geographical proximity has been 
left open.12 In Australia, the High Court has declined to adopt the approach taken in the UK cases, 
but nonetheless has recognised the reality of the floodgates concern in mental injury cases.13 
Indeed, in all three countries an important control before liability can be imposed in such cases is a 
requirement that the plaintiff be shown to be suffering from a medically identifiable psychiatric 
illness or injury.14 In practice this means that a plaintiff’s injury needs to fall within a psychiatric 
diagnostic category found in medical literature, notably the American Diagnostic and Statistical 
 
9 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 at 638 per Lord Oliver. 
10 Page v Smith (No 1) [1996] 1 AC 155. 
11 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410; Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 
12 van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179. 
13 Tame v New South Wales: Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 35, (2002) 211 CLR 317 at [5]-[7]. 
14 McLoughlin v O’Brian, above n 11 at 418; van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit, above n 12 at [65]; 
Tame v New South Wales: Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd, above n 13 at [192]-[194]. In the UK at least, 
and maybe elsewhere, it seems the rule applies even where the harm is intentionally inflicted. In Wainwright v 
Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] AC 406 Lord Hoffmann reserved his opinion but showed little support for 
relaxing the rule, and in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32, [2015] 2 WLR 1373 neither party sought to question 
the orthodox requirement. 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)15 and in the International Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD-10).16 
 
In Saadati v Moorhead17 the Supreme Court of Canada declined to join the overseas consensus. 
Saadati (S) was driving a vehicle which was struck by a vehicle driven by Moorhead (M). S sued M in 
negligence, seeking damages for non-pecuniary loss and past income loss arising from the accident. 
The trial judge held that the claim succeeded, finding that the accident caused S psychological 
injuries, including personality change and cognitive difficulties. This finding did not rest on an 
identified medical cause or expert evidence, but was based on the testimony of S’s friends and 
family to the effect that S’s personality had changed for the worse after the accident. The Court of 
Appeal allowed M’s appeal, on the ground that S had not demonstrated by expert evidence a 
medically recognised psychiatric or psychological injury. But the Supreme Court allowed S’s further 
appeal and restored the decision of the trial judge. 
 
Brown J delivered the judgment of the Court. His Honour noted that the Supreme Court had not 
adopted either the primary/secondary victim analysis or the disaggregated proximity analysis 
propounded in the UK cases. Rather, he affirmed that recovery for mental injury in negligence law 
depended upon the claimant satisfying the criteria applicable to any successful action in negligence: 
a duty of care, a breach, damage, and a legal and factual causal relationship between the breach and 
the damage.18 Canadian negligence law recognised that a duty existed at common law to take 
reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable mental injury, and that this cause of action protected a 
person’s right to be free from negligent interference with mental health. The ordinary duty of care 
analysis was, therefore, to be applied to claims for negligently caused mental injury. In particular, 
liability for mental injury should be confined to claims which satisfied the proximity analysis within 
the duty of care framework and the remoteness inquiry. Each of the ordinary elements to liability 
could pose a significant hurdle: not all claimants alleging mental injury would be in a relationship of 
proximity with defendants necessary to ground a duty of care; not all conduct resulting in mental 
harm would breach the standard of care; not all mental disturbances would amount to true 
“damage” qualifying as mental injury, which was “serious and prolonged” and rose above the 
ordinary emotional disturbances that would occasionally afflict any member of civil society without 
violating his or her right to be free of negligently caused mental injury; and not all mental injury was 
caused, in fact or in law, by the defendant’s negligent conduct. 
 
These being the core principles, his Honour turned to consider the state of the law which the Court 
was now asked to evaluate — the law developed by Canadian lower courts requiring claimants 
alleging mental injury to show that such injury had manifested itself to an expert in psychiatry in the 
form of a clinically diagnosed, recognisable psychiatric illness.19 This had, therefore, placed the 
 
15 American Psychiatric Association American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed, 
2013). 
16 World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th revision, 
Geneva, 1993). 
17 Saadati v Moorhead [2017] SCC 28. 
18 Above n 17 at [19], citing Mustapha v Culligan of Canada Ltd 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114. 
19 For example, Vanek v Great Atlantic and Pacific Co of Canada (1999) 48 OR (3d) 228, at [65]-[67]; Young v 
Borzoni 2007 BCCA 16, 277 DLR (4th) 685; Healey v Lakeridge Health Corporation 2011 ONCA 55, 103 OR (3d) 
categories of mental and emotional harm for which damages might be recovered in the hands of 
psychiatry. “Whatever that discipline chooses to identify and name as a psychiatric illness becomes 
the law’s boundaries for damages in this area”.20 Yet confining compensable mental injury to 
conditions that were identifiable with reference to the medical profession’s diagnostic tools was 
inherently suspect as a matter of legal methodology.21 While, for treatment purposes, an accurate 
diagnosis was obviously important, a trier of fact adjudicating a claim of mental injury was not 
concerned with diagnosis, but with symptoms and their effects. Put simply, there was no necessary 
relationship between reasonably foreseeable mental injury and a diagnostic classification scheme. A 
negligent defendant need only be shown to have foreseen injury, and not a particular psychiatric 
illness that came with its own label. In other words, the trier of fact’s inquiry should be directed to 
the level of harm that the claimant’s particular symptoms represented, not to whether a label could 
be attached to them. Downloading the task of assessing legally recoverable mental injury to the DSM 
and ICD therefore imported an arbitrary control mechanism upon recovery for mental injury, 
conditioning recovery not upon any legally principled basis directed to the alleged injury, but upon 
conformity with a legally irrelevant classification scheme designed to facilitate identification of 
particular conditions. 
 
Brown J affirmed that none of this was to suggest that mental injury was always as readily 
demonstrable as physical injury.22 While allegations of injury to muscular tissue might sometimes 
pose challenges to triers of fact, many physical conditions such as lacerations and broken bones 
were objectively verifiable. Mental injury, however, would often not be as readily apparent. Further, 
mental injury was not proven by the existence of mere psychological upset. While tort law protected 
people from negligent interference with their mental health, there was no legally cognizable right to 
happiness. Claimants had to show show much more — that the disturbance was serious and 
prolonged and rose above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties and fears that came with living in civil 
society.23 This did not denote distinct legal treatment of mental injury relative to physical injury; 
rather, it went to the prior legal question of what constituted “mental injury”. Ultimately, the 
claimant’s task in establishing a mental injury was to show the requisite degree of disturbance, not 
to show its classification as a recognised psychiatric illness. 
 
Brown J affirmed also that the Court was not suggesting that expert evidence could not assist in 
determining whether or not a mental injury had been shown.24 In assessing whether a claimant had 
succeeded, it would often be important to consider, for example, how seriously the claimant’s 
cognitive functions and participation in daily activities had been impaired, the length of such 
impairment and the nature and effect of any treatment.25 To the extent that claimants did not 
adduce relevant expert evidence to assist triers of fact in applying these and any other relevant 
 
401. 
20 Citing van Soest, above n 12 at [100], per Thomas J, dissenting. 
21 Above n 17 at [31]-[36]. 
22 Above n 17 at [37]. 
23 Citing Mustapha above n 18 at [9] on this point. 
24 Above n 17 at [38]. 
25 Citing Mulheron, “Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognised Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence Claims” 
(2012) 32 Oxf J Leg Stud 77 at 109. 
considerations, they ran a risk of being found to have fallen short. Courts could be informed by the 
expert opinion of modern medical knowledge without needing to address the question whether the 
mental suffering was a recognisable psychiatric illness or not.26 However, while relevant expert 
evidence would often be helpful in determining whether a claimant had proven a mental injury, it 
was not required as a matter of law. 
 
As recognised above, the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada draws upon, and is 
entirely consistent with, the dissenting judgment of Thomas J in van Soest v Residual Health 
Management Unit.27 In this case Blanchard J, speaking for the majority in the Court of Appeal, 
accepted that the need to show a medically recognisable psychiatric injury was the law in New 
Zealand, and the plaintiffs not having claimed to have suffered actual psychiatric injury their actions 
had to fail. Thomas J would have relaxed the requirement. His Honour suggested a test of mental 
suffering which, although not commanding a psychiatric label, is plainly outside the range of 
ordinary human experience. Perhaps the decision in Saadati presages the abandonment of the 
majority view and the acceptance of Thomas J’s dissent. Thomas J noted that the restriction placed 
the categories of mental harm for which damages could be recovered in the hands of psychiatry. Yet 
there was no necessary relationship between the concept of reasonable foreseeability and 
psychiatry’s classification of psychiatric illness. A negligent wrongdoer might be able to foresee 
mental harm to a person but not a particular or any psychiatric illness. The restriction was simply an 
arbitrary way of limiting the number of claimants. Further, the courts could be informed by the 
expert opinion of modern medical knowledge. Doctors could speak with a great deal of precision 
without needing to address the question whether the mental suffering was a recognisable 
psychiatric illness or not. Even so, his Honour recognised that, whatever its shortcomings, the 
restriction provided a convenient handle. He did not advocate that it be abandoned altogether but 
considered that it should not be applied in absolute terms. Plaintiffs as a general rule would still seek 
to prove a recognisable psychiatric illness. But this could be subject to a qualification which 
recognised a claim for mental suffering which, although not commanding a psychiatric label, was 
plainly outside the range of ordinary human experience. That would be subject to expert evidence, 
and would be no different in kind or difficulty than any number of questions that were regularly 
resolved in the courts. His Honour foreshadowed that eventually the question might be whether a 
plaintiff could show that his or her grief or sorrow was more than the grief or sorrow that was part 
of the ordinary vicissitudes of life. 
 
In van Soest Blanchard J was not persuaded that this would be a workable test. Again, in Tame v New 
South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd the High Court of Australia saw the need to show 
actual psychiatric injury as a useful control. Gummow and Kirby JJ maintained that many of the 
concerns underlying recovery for psychiatric injury tended to recede if full force was given to the 
distinction between emotional distress and a recognisable psychiatric illness. It reduced the scope 
for indeterminate liability or increased litigation, restricted recovery to those disorders capable of 
objective determination, and posited a distinction grounded in principle rather than pragmatism that 
was illuminated by professional medical opinion rather than fixed by purely idiosyncratic judicial 
 
26 Citing Thomas J in van Soest above n 12 at [103]. 
27 Above n 12 at [78]-[120].  
perception.28 Even so, reliance on psychiatry may provide no superior solution, for psychiatric 
diagnosis is an uncertain and sometimes unreliable science. The point is graphically illustrated by the 
fact that until quite recent times homosexuality was categorised as a mental disorder, being 
removed from the DSM in 1974 and from the ICD only in 1993.29 On any view diagnosis may require 
psychiatrists to make judgments of degree. Thomas J’s and the SCC’s views may simply change the 
qualifying threshold without making the law any more uncertain. As for whether this would open the 
floodgates, it may be that the fear is overstated. Relaxation of the rules of liability has often led to 
floodgates fears which have not eventuated. And finally there is the question of legal principle. Very 
arguably, the courts rather than psychiatrists should have the final word. 
 
Actions arising from birth 
Actions arising from birth tend to give rise to vexing policy questions involving, broadly, whether the 
life of a child or some feature of that life should be regarded in law as actionable damage. A doctor 
or other medical professional may have negligently performed a sterilisation operation, or given 
negligent advice as to its efficacy. If the patient later conceives an unplanned child, the question 
arises whether the doctor can be liable to the patient and/or his or her partner for the costs of 
bringing up the child. This is a question concerning so-called “wrongful conception”, with decisions 
overseas taking differing views. In England, in McFarlane v Tayside Health Board,30 the House of 
Lords held that a mother who became pregnant following her husband’s failed vasectomy could 
claim general damages for the pain, suffering and inconvenience of pregnancy and childbirth and for 
associated expenses, but that the parents could not recover the costs of bringing up their child. 
However, in a case where the child was born with disabilities, the English Court of Appeal allowed a 
claim for extra expenses attributable to the disability.31 Then in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital 
NHS Trust32 the House of Lords put a “gloss” on McFarlane by holding that in all failed sterilisation 
cases the courts should make a conventional lump sum award of £15,000, in order to mark the legal 
wrong suffered by the mother in losing the opportunity to live her life in the way that she wished 
and planned. In contrast to these decisions, in Cattanach v Melchior,33 the High Court of Australia 
held in a four to three majority decision that a doctor who negligently failed to sterilise a patient was 
liable for upbringing costs on the application of ordinary principles of negligence. And should the 
child be disabled it is apparent that those costs would include the disability costs. But suppose the 
claim is brought not by the parents but by the disabled child, alleging negligence by the medical 
advisers of his or her mother or father in failing to diagnose or warn about the disability or risk of 
disability. In Harriton v Stephens34 the High Court of Australia rejected such a claim, for had the 
defendant not been negligent the mother would have opted to undergo an abortion and the plaintiff 
 
28 Above n 13 at [194]. 
29 This was pointed out by Brown J in Saadati, above n 17 at [32]. 
30 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59. 
31 Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2002] QB 266; and see Whitehead v Searle 
[2009] 1 WLR 549; Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 1203, [2010] 1 WLR 2139. 
32 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52, [2004] 1 AC 309. 
33 Cattanach v Melchior [2003] HCA 38, (2003) 215 CLR 1. 
34 Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15, (2006) 226 CLR 52; and see also Waller v James [2006] HCA 16, (2006) 
226 CLR 136. 
would never have been born. It was a claim for so-called “wrongful life”, and, as Crennan J stated, 
life with disabilities, like life, was not actionable. 
Recent litigation in the Netherlands and in Singapore has involved new and highly controversial 
types of claim arising out of the “wrongful” birth of a child. In the Netherlands case, twelve people 
who were conceived with sperm from a Dutch fertility centre brought claims against the centre, 
asserting that its longtime director (a Dr Jan Karbaat) was their biological father, and that over 
several decades he swapped donors’ sperm with his own. These, then, are “wrongful life” claims. 
Ten mothers who suspected that their children were conceived using Dr Karbaat’s sperm also 
brought actions, asking the court to give them access to Dr Karbaat’s DNA (who by then had died at 
the age of 89).35 The court ruled in this case that DNA tests could be carried out, but held also that 
the results should remain sealed until another judge ruled whether or not the results could be 
compared with the DNA of a group of children born via in vitro fertilisation (IVF).36 So, at the time of 
writing, the litigation was in its early stages, certainly with many difficult questions remaining to be 
resolved. 
We can find possible answers to some of the difficulties in the decision of the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd.37 The plaintiff and her husband sought to conceive a child 
through IVF, but due to the defendant’s negligence the plaintiff’s ovum was fertilised using the 
sperm of an unknown third party. The plaintiff gave birth to a healthy child without knowing about 
this error, but on discovering what had happened she sought damages from the defendant in 
respect of her pregnancy, the cost of bringing up the child and the loss of autonomy involved in 
conceiving the child by the sperm of a stranger rather than by that of her husband. Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong JA, delivering the judgment of the court, allowed the claim for a small amount of 
damages for pain and suffering arising from the pregnancy, denied the plaintiff’s claim in respect of 
the upkeep of the child, denied the claim for loss of autonomy, but recognised that the plaintiff had 
suffered a loss of “genetic affinity”, and that this should be an actionable head of damage. The first 
two findings were based on the law in the UK as laid down in McFarlane’s case,38 and no more will 
be said about them here.39 Our focus will be on the latter two findings. 
The claim for loss of autonomy was founded upon the decision of the House of Lords in Rees.40 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA recognised that it was an inadequate response for the court to 
concentrate only on upkeep costs, and that giving damages for a loss of autonomy avoided certain 
policy objections to the upkeep claim. This was because the claim looked not to the cost of the child 
measured by its care liabilities but to the independent interests of the parents.41 But a difficulty with 
the decision was that there was no clear consensus in the House of Lords on the nature of injury that 






37 ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] SGCA 20. 
38 Above n 30 
39 These heads of claim are discussed in Todd, The Law of Torts in New Zealand (7th ed, 2016), at [6.9.03]. 
40 Above n 32. 
41 Above n 37 at [108]. 
compensatory.42 His Honour noted also that the concept of a loss of autonomy was further 
considered in the House of Lords decision in Chester v Afshar,43 a case about the creation of a 
narrow exception to the traditional principles of causation in the context of a doctor-patient 
relationship,44 where three of the Law Lords identified the plaintiff’s autonomy as an important 
consideration that the law should recognise. For example, Lord Steyn observed that a patient’s right 
to be warned about the risks of an operation ought normatively to be regarded as an important 
right, and that it was grounded in, amongst other things, the need to ensure that due respect was 
given to the autonomy and dignity of each patient.45 
 
After reviewing these decisions, and a “veritable mountain” of material written on the subject, 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA concluded that the court should not take the step of recognising a loss 
of autonomy (without more) as an actionable injury in its own right. Such a development would, he 
thought, pose significant problems of legal coherence and would be contrary to well-established 
principles on the recovery of damages. First, there was the “conceptual objection”. This was that 
autonomy was too nebulous and too contested a concept to ground a claim. It was the subject of 
theoretical and conceptual disagreement which turned on fundamental questions of political and 
moral philosophy. Without a workable concept of autonomy, it was impossible to say that autonomy 
could, in and of itself, be the subject matter of legal protection.46 Second, the notion of a loss of 
autonomy did not comport with the concept of damage in the tort of negligence. This was the 
“coherence objection”. The common law had traditionally understood “damage” in terms of 
objective detriment: in order to make out a cause of action, claimants had to demonstrate that they 
were more than minimally worse off than they would otherwise have been. However, the difficulty 
was that most interferences with autonomy would fall far short of this standard. Any paternalistic 
act, such as that of forcing someone to belt up while in a motor vehicle, would technically constitute 
an interference with autonomy, even if it made the person better off. It would be difficult, in those 
circumstances, to identify precisely what it was that the claimant should be compensated for. The 
notion of an action for loss of autonomy was more compatible with a rights-based vindicatory model 
of tort law. But the common law was less interested in rights and more interested in remedies for 
harms.47 Third, the recognition of such a head of damage would undermine existing control 
mechanisms which kept recovery in the tort of negligence within sensible bounds. This was the 
“over-inclusiveness objection”. The problem was that any form of damage could, with some 
ingenuity, be reconceptualised in terms of a damage to autonomy, such as, for example, loss of 
autonomy in Rothwell.48 It would allow the requirement of actionable damage to be side-stepped 
almost at will.49 
 
 
42 Above n 37 at [111]. For the views of their Lordships on the question, see above n 30 per Lord Bingham at 
[8], Lord Nicholls at [17], Lord Millett at [123], Lord Scott at [148]. 
43 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134. 
44 Todd, above n 39 at [20.2.05]. 
45 Above n 43 at [17], [18], [24]. See also Lord Hoffmann at [33]-[34], Lord Hope at [87]. 
46 Above n 37 at [116-[119]. 
47 Above n 37 at [120-[122]. 
48 Above n 2. 
49 Above n 37 at [123]-[124]. 
Accordingly, his Honour was not disposed to recognise the loss of autonomy as a recoverable head 
of damage in its own right. However, this was not to say that the court did not recognise the 
relevance of autonomy as an important background consideration. In the instant case the appellant 
had suffered a severe dislocation of her reproductive plans that was constituted principally by the 
fracture of biological parenthood, and to say simply that she had suffered a “loss of autonomy” was 
only correct at the highest level of generality. Her loss could not be understood without a more 
developed and substantive (as well as nuanced) notion of “autonomy” that took into account 
existing family building practices, kinship arrangements, and the socially-constituted value of genetic 
relatedness. The true loss which she had suffered in this case, which could and should be considered 
a distinct and recognisable head of damage, was a loss of genetic affinity. 
 
The desire for genetic affinity was complex and multi-faceted. It was, at its core, a desire for identity 
bounded in consanguinity. The ordinary human experience was that parents and children were 
bound by ties of blood and share physical traits. This fact of biological experience – heredity – 
carried deep socio-cultural significance. It was affinity which distinguished familial ties from ties of 
friendship. Persons who consciously chose to undergo IVF did so because of a deep desire to 
experience, as far as it was possible, the ordinary experience and incidents of parenthood. And 
when, as in the present case, a person had been denied this experience due to the negligence of 
others then she had lost something of profound significance and has suffered a serious wrong. The 
appellant’s interest in maintaining the integrity of her reproductive plans in this very specific sense – 
where she had made a conscious decision to have a child with her husband to maintain an 
intergenerational genetic link and to preserve “affinity” – was one which the law should recognise 
and protect.50 
 
Turning to the question of quantification of damages, Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA recognised that 
awarding a conventional fixed sum, as in Rees, would have the virtues of consistency, uniformity, 
expedience, and fairness to commend it. However, he did not consider it to be appropriate in the 
instant case, for two reasons. First, it would be contrary to the value of individual autonomy, which 
lay at the heart of the current award. The award of a uniform sum presupposed that all parents were 
identically situated and would be impacted in the same way by the disruption of their reproductive 
plans. If the objective was to compensate the particular plaintiff for the particular types of harm 
which had been inflicted, then the award should be tailored to the facts and circumstances of each 
case. 
 
Another approach was to award a conventional sum (not to be confused with a “conventional 
award”, since it was not fixed across all cases, but was instead tailored to the unique facts of each 
case) for the non-pecuniary loss suffered in the particular case. It was vital to take into account the 
unique types of harm suffered by a person when his or her reproductive plans were disrupted in 
deciding on an appropriate award. These types of harm would vary depending on the particular 
reasons fertility treatment was sought, the precise manner in which the negligence took place, and 
the personal circumstances of the plaintiff (such as the presence of other children or the familial 
and/or cultural histories particular to him or her). So the court should benchmark the eventual 
award as a percentage of the financial costs of raising the child. Although this was not an 
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appropriate case in which to award upkeep costs as such to the appellant, the financial costs of 
raising the child were not wholly irrelevant as, absent such costs, there would be no other criterion 
or standard by which to assess the quantum of damages that ought to be awarded. This approach 
would have several advantages. First, to the extent that one of the purposes behind the grant of 
damages for non-pecuniary loss was to provide solace to the claimant, an award which was 
benchmarked against upkeep costs would achieve this purpose. Second, any such award would not 
be derisory but would instead produce a substantial award that offered reasonable compensation. 
Whilst it was perhaps not theoretically elegant, the approach of benchmarking the present award 
against upkeep costs was practical, and it prevented the court from having to pluck a figure out of 
thin air, so to speak.51 
 
The award of full upkeep costs would amount to giving the appellant an indemnity for the costs of 
raising the baby. This would not be appropriate compensation for the loss which had been suffered. 
However, it was also neither logical nor desirable to award the appellant a merely nominal sum, 
because to do so would be to make a mockery of the value of the interest at stake. It was clear that 
the damages to be awarded should therefore lie somewhere between these two extremes. On the 
issue of precisely where along the spectrum it should fall, the facts and circumstances were of the 
first importance. It was clear that substantial damages ought to be awarded. Whilst the appellant 
and her husband had accepted the child as their own, the reality of the situation and the anguish, 
stigma, disconcertment, and embarrassment suffered by the appellant and her family could not be 
denied. The appellant should be awarded 30% of the financial costs of raising the child as 
compensation, which was an amount that properly reflected sufficiently the seriousness of the 
appellant’s loss and was just, equitable, and proportionate in the circumstances of the case.52  
  
In reaching this conclusion, the Singapore Court of Appeal took account of the decision of the 
Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in A & B v A Health and Social Services Trust.53 In this case the 
plaintiffs, who were twins, were children born as a result of IVF treatment provided by the 
defendant to the plaintiffs’ mother. The parents of the plaintiffs were white, and they requested 
that any children born as a result of IVF treatment should have the same skin colour. The defendants 
used the wrong sperm, and as a result the plaintiffs were obviously darker in complexion than their 
parents. They sought damages from the defendant alleging personal injuries, loss and damage, but 
the court held that their claim had to fail. Girvan LJ said that it would be perverse and objectionable 
to suggest that children born with a different skin colour to their parents were in some way 
damaged, disabled or injured. The fact that they were subjected to intolerant and offensive remarks 
did not mean that they were damaged by the factors which led the intolerant to make the 
comments. However, the decision differs from that in ACB in two critical respects. First, there could 
be no loss of genetic affinity in A & B, as the sperm to be used was always going to be that of a donor 
rather than that of the husband. Secondly, the claim was brought by the children: it was, therefore, a 
claim for their “wrongful life”. If the mother had been inseminated with the “correct” sperm, any 
children born as a consequence would have been a different colour, but they also would have been 
different persons. They could only exist in this world as a result of what had actually happened. 
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Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA said that the court respectfully agreed with the decision in A & B, but 
there were matters there which gave pause for thought. A perceptive commentator had explained 
that the approach taken by the court reduced the alleged harm to irrelevant physical variation and 
failed to give voice to the true harm that was suffered.54 One could not assess the case without a 
proper appreciation of the social context, which was that Northern Ireland, where the appellants 
lived, was overwhelmingly white and there was a history of racially-motivated bullying of children. 
This was simply to recognise that race as a social concept could lie at the root of real and significant 
harms, including unkind questions as to a wife’s fidelity and the paternity of children. His Honour 
drew attention to these points, because they represented the social reality that the present court 
had to confront, even if it did not support it. 
 
Returning, then, to the present case, by awarding damages for loss of genetic affinity the court in 
ACB appears to have recognised a wholly new head of claim in “wrongful birth” litigation. Perhaps, 
however, it is not so very different in principle from the decision in Rees. The approach taken to the 
quantification of the claim certainly differs, but fairly clearly Rees does not purport to decide that 
“loss of autonomy” without more is an actionable head of claim. Rather, the decision is essentially 
about loss of reproductive autonomy. The different kinds of claim that have come before the courts 
are all variations on that theme, and they all give rise to unique questions. One of the arguments 
advanced by the majority in Cattanach v Melchior,55 a wrongful conception case, was that the claim 
for upbringing was an ordinary medical injury claim, for financial loss consequent upon physical 
injury to the mother (the unwanted pregnancy). But whether one supports this kind of claim or not, 
treating the cost of a child as a “loss” and giving damages for upbringing certainly is not an 
“ordinary” claim. As one commentator has remarked, the view that judges do not make law and that 
“legal principle” can tell us whether Dr Cattanach should have been held responsible for the cost of 
rearing Jordan Melchior might be called a fairy tale.56 Rees provides an alternative to giving 
upbringing damages and is one possible solution to the question. Whether a claim for loss of genetic 
affinity ought to be accepted and, if it should, how such a claim ought to be quantified similarly 
raises acute policy questions (just as does a claim for the costs of bringing up an unplanned child). 
The decision in ACB, allowing the recovery of damages, very arguably is founded on good and 
persuasive considerations of policy. 
 
The negligent building owner 
 
Invercargill City Council v Southland Indoor Leisure Centre Charitable Trust57 is a defective building case 
with an unusual twist. The Southland Trust owned a sports stadium in Invercargill. During construction 
the roof sagged due to negligence by the Trust’s consulting engineer (M). The Trust arranged for remedial 
work, which was competently designed by an independent engineer (H). The Invercargill City Council 
insisted that the Trust seek a building consent for the remedial work, requiring of the Trust that M should 
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certify that the work met specifications set by H. But the work did not meet those specifications and M 
did not inspect the work and nor did the Council, which relied on M. The Council then issued a Code 
Compliance Certificate (CCC). Subsequently the Trust took advice about the roof from H, who 
recommended an inspection, but the Trust did not follow this advice. Four years later the roof collapsed 
following a heavy snowfall. Any claim for alleged negligent inspection was time-barred, but the Trust 
claimed that the Council was liable in negligence and for negligent misstatement for issuing the CCC. 
 
Miller J, delivering the first judgment, drew attention to the fact that the Trust was a commissioning 
owner; it commissioned the building, contracting the architect, the engineer and the builder. This 
was a potential point of distinction from the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sunset Terraces58 and 
Spencer on Byron,59 where duties had been imposed. The instant claim rested on the negligent issue 
of the CCC and not on earlier acts or omissions, such as inspections, and it was, therefore, a 
negligent misstatement case. A duty thus required (a) proximity or a “special relationship”; (b) policy 
reasons not excluding a duty; (c) whether, in the above light, a duty was “fair, just and reasonable; 
(d) specific reliance and loss. His Honour observed that reliance arose at two points in this 
framework: the defendant's expectation of reliance formed an element of the duty and the 
plaintiff's actual reliance affected causation.60 
Starting with proximity, Miller J recognised that the Council knew of the CCC's purpose and 
audience. It chose to assume a degree of responsibility, having insisted the Trust seek consent for 
the remedial work. The Council expected that the Trust would have the work inspected for code 
compliance by an independent engineer, but should be taken to have known that the Trust expected 
it to insist on M supplying a producer statement confirming that the work was code-compliant. Next, 
as between it and the Council, the Trust was not vulnerable. It was realistic to expect the Trust, with 
the assistance of its advisers, to identify and manage the risk that the work might be badly designed 
or executed. Further, it was the commissioning owner, and used its position to assert control over 
the remedial work. And it relied on the producer statement tendered by M in circumstances where it 
was made clear that the local authority would not inspect the work itself but would rely on the 
statement. Turning to wider policy concerns, the commissioning owner’s responsibility for code 
compliance was not in itself a defence for a local authority, although it might sound in contributory 
negligence. But an efficiency factor was that, as between the Council and a commissioning owner, 
the owner ought to be able to avoid the risk by imposing quality control mechanisms in its contracts 
with the builders, architects and engineers. Subsequent owners lacked the same opportunity. In 
summary, on the question whether a duty was fair and reasonable in light of these factors, his 
Honour determined that the Council should not be taken to have assumed a duty to inspect the 
work itself, but that it had assumed a different and lesser responsibility, that of checking that an 
appropriately qualified person had supplied adequate evidence that the consent conditions had 
been met. There was nothing unfair or unreasonable about the imposition of a duty to do that 
much.61 
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Miller J said that it was not disputed that the Council was negligent in issuing a CCC for the remedial 
work before receiving the producer statement, for it had no way of knowing that the work was in 
fact code-compliant. But it denied that the Trust ever relied on the CCC. This being a misstatement 
claim, specific reliance had to be proved, and the evidence indicated that the Trust did not rely on 
the CCC at any relevant time for assurance that the work complied with the building code. It relied 
rather on its own agents. So the claim should have failed at trial for want of causation.62 But he said 
that if he was wrong and the Council was liable, then he would fix the Trust’s contributory 
negligence at 50%.63 
Harrison and Cooper JJ, in a joint judgment, also held that the claim failed. They said that it was a case 
of an owner of a building whose contractors were alone responsible for creating defects which caused it 
loss seeking to recover the full amount of that loss from another party. In Governors of the Peabody 
Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd64 the House of Lords attributed an architect’s negligence 
in failing to ensure compliance with drainage regulations to an owner, saying it was incumbent on the 
owner to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions. Again, in The Grange65 Blanchard J accepted 
that in the building and related fields a duty of care did not extend to protecting a person who brought 
about his own loss by negligence. Here the Trust through its building contractors, engineer and architect 
breached a similar duty in failing to carry out the remedial work in accordance with the building consent 
and then in advising the Council incorrectly that the work had been properly completed. The 
consequences of the agents’ fault should be attributed to the Trust, which could not assert that the 
Council owed it a separate duty of care to protect it against the same negligence and indemnify it against 
the same loss.66 
 
The same result was independently justified by applying settled principles on claims for negligent 
misstatement. The relationship should be of such a nature that (a) the Council knew inferentially that the 
Trust would use the certificate for the purpose of satisfying itself that the stadium complied with the 
code; (b) the certificate would likely be acted upon without independent inquiry; and (c) the Trust must 
have acted in that way. The purpose of a CCC was a notice to all interested parties – including the owner 
– of the Council’s reasonable satisfaction that the building had been constructed in accordance with the 
building code. But its rationale did not extend to protecting the economic interests of a commissioning 
owner which had chosen to protect itself by engaging professional advisers and contractors. By engaging 
these third parties the owner had assumed direct control over the design and construction functions and 
relied on those parties. It was objectively unreasonable for the Trust to rely on the CCC for the purpose 
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Further, the evidence did not show specific reliance by the Trust on the CCC. The Trust was indifferent to 
whether a final certificate was issued or not, and elected to open the stadium without obtaining a CCC 
for the remedial work. Rather, sole reliance was placed on its own experts.68 
 
Finally, in the event that the Council was held to owe a duty of care to the Trust, it would have been 
entitled to argue that the Trust contributed substantially to its own damage. Their Honours agreed with 
Miller J that, in that event, the damages should be reduced by 50% for contributory negligence.69 
 
It is apparent that the heart of this decision lies in the court’s finding that the plaintiff was a “negligent 
building owner” who had commissioned the work and to whom no duty was owed. However, as a general 
rule, the fact that independent experts acting for a plaintiff may have been negligent does not operate 
to deny a duty of care which normally is owed to that plaintiff by other defendants. So we need to pin 
down when this principle will apply. Harrison and Cooper JJ affirmed that the question turned on 
whether the rules of attribution – the law’s treatment of one party’s acts or omissions as those of another 
– should apply. They recognised that normally the Trust would not be attributed with the negligent 
conduct of its independent contractors, but different considerations prevailed where a claimant, whose 
loss was directly caused by those contracted experts, asserted that a territorial authority nevertheless 
owed it a duty when performing its statutory functions to protect it against the same loss. One critical 
factor was the degree of integration of the acts or omissions of a formally independent contractor into 
the construction project, particularly if they involved the sort of work which would otherwise be carried 
out by an employee. The statutory language and policy all assumed importance in this respect. And their 
Honours ultimately saw no difficulty in attributing their experts’ acts or omissions to the Trust. Within a 
policy inquiry, a negligent act or omission by a building professional engaged by the commissioning 
owner to carry out its own statutory requirement ought to be attributable to that owner.70 
 
This appears to be a special rule of attribution, as contemplated by the decision of the Privy Council in 
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission71  A company is personally liable 
where the tortious conduct of a director, servant or agent is attributed to the company. Lord Hoffmann 
said that the acts and knowledge of a company are necessarily those of individuals, and so the true issue 
is whether such acts and knowledge can be attributed to the company. The primary rules of attribution 
are to be found in the company’s constitution, but these can be supplemented by general rules that apply 
to individuals, such as agency and estoppel. Furthermore, in an exceptional case, where application of 
those principles would defeat the intended application of a particular provision to companies, it would 
be necessary to devise a special rule of attribution to determine whose acts or knowledge or state of 
mind was for the purpose of that provision to be attributed to the company. So here the Trust (not a 
natural person) has been attributed with the conduct of third parties. Attribution often concerns the 
conduct of company officers and the question is whether the conduct of the particular individual should 
be treated as that of the company. The Southland case has gone further in applying the principle to 
independent contractors, in circumstances where the contractors were integrated into the building 
 
68 Above n 57 at [199]-[200]. 
69 Above n 57 at [208-[209]. 
70 Above n 57 at [179-[181]. 
71 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500. 
project and the Trust itself was obliged to comply with the statutory requirements imposed on a 
commissioning building owner. 
 
It is clear that, in the absence of such attributed conduct, negligence by an owner’s experts will not bar 
the owner’s claim. If a duty is owed, the question then is one of causation and contributory negligence. 
This was the view taken in Riddell v Porteous,72 where the Court of Appeal recognised that sometimes 
the effective cause of the loss would be the conduct of the council, sometimes responsibility should be 
laid at the door of the owners, and sometimes there should be an apportionment between them. In the 
instant case an owner had employed a building contractor who had deliberately departed from the plans, 
after which the council had negligently failed to make a proper inspection. In these circumstances the 
owner was held free of any blame. Again, in Ingles v Tutkaluk Construction Ltd73 the Supreme Court of 
Canada affirmed that an owner-builder’s negligence does not remove him or her from the scope of a 
municipality’s duty of care. Rather, in very rare circumstances it can be considered as a complete defence 
to a finding of negligence on the part of municipal inspectors. 
 
An appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal has been heard by the Supreme Court, but at the 
date of writing (October 2017) no judgment had been delivered. The decision is perhaps vulnerable 
to the argument that it has the capacity to exclude claims by commissioning owners in cases where it 
has been commonly imposed, in particular those involving private owners who commission the 
building of their house. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would contemplate such a result. 
One final point of clarification. While Southland bars a negligent commissioning owner, it does not 
suggest that subsequent owners cannot sue either. On the contrary, as Harrison and Cooper JJ noted, a 
CCC gives notice to all interested parties of the Council’s reasonable satisfaction that the building has 
been constructed in accordance with the building code. Its primary objective is to protect the health and 
safety of those who use the certified building, and it also exists for the secondary purpose of protecting 
financial interests, particularly subsequent and prospective owners.74 Certainly the Council owes a duty 
of care in such a case. 
 
Scope of the duty of care 
Courts frequently say that defendants can only be liable for loss which is within the scope of their duty 
to take care.75 While that observation applies generally, a common instance where its implications 
must be taken into account is where a person relies upon information or advice provided by another 
and suffers loss which is exacerbated by some intervening external factor. In three consolidated 
appeals in the House of Lords, reported as South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York 
Montague Ltd (SAAMCO),76 the question at issue was the extent of liability of valuers who made 
negligent over-valuations of property offered as security for a loan in respect of loss associated with 
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a subsequent fall in the property market. The Court of Appeal had held that the valuers were liable for 
the whole loss in all three cases, on the ground that a fall in the market was foreseeable and, but for 
the valuers’ negligence, the lenders would not have entered the transactions at all. In the House of 
Lords a different test was applied, and the valuers were held liable only for the foreseeable 
consequences of the information being wrong. What this means in practice is that a valuer’s liability 
is subject to a ceiling represented by the difference between the valuation given and the actual value 
at the date of the valuation. So loss which is equal to or less than that difference is recoverable, but 
any greater loss is borne by the lender. The operation of the principle is often known as the SAAMCO 
cap, although the explanation in law is that the greater loss is outside the scope of the defendant’s 
duty. 
What exactly the SAAMCO case decided and how it should be understood was addressed by the UK 
Supreme Court in Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors.77 The claimant agreed with a builder and developer 
to lend the sum of £200,000 in the mistaken belief that the money was intended for developing a 
disused building into office premises. However, the builder had different plans for the site, which 
would have been unacceptable to the claimant had he known about them. The defendant solicitors 
were instructed to draw up a facility letter and a charge over the building, and in doing so they used a 
template from another transaction which stated that the loan was for a contribution to the costs of 
the development. This unintentionally confirmed the claimant’s mistaken understanding of the 
builder’s plans, and the claimant advanced the loan. The transaction was a failure and the claimant 
sued the builder, alleging fraud and negligence, and the solicitors, alleging dishonest assistance and 
negligence. The trial judge dismissed all the claims save that of negligence against the solicitors, and 
awarded the claimant his entire loss. The Court of Appeal allowed the solicitors’ appeal and held the 
whole loss was attributable to the claimant’s misjudgements. The claimant appealed to the Supreme 
Court. 
Lord Sumption, delivering a judgment with which all of their Lordships agreed, said that while it 
was generally a necessary condition for the recovery of a loss that it would not have been suffered 
but for the breach of a duty, it was not always a sufficient condition. The law was concerned with 
assigning responsibility for the consequences of the breach, and a defendant was not necessarily 
responsible for everything that followed from his act, even if it was wrongful. The relevant filters 
were not limited to those which could be analysed in terms of causation, and all depended 
ultimately on a developed judicial instinct about the nature or extent of the duty which the 
wrongdoer had broken. So where a defendant supplied information which was only one of the 
factors relevant to the decision whether to proceed with a transaction, the claimant could only 
recover that part of his loss which was within the scope of the defendant’s duty of care and would 
have been avoided had the defendant not breached that duty. If the defendant’s contribution had 
been to supply material which the defendant would take into account in making his own decision 
based upon a broader assessment of the risks, the defendant had no legal responsibility for the 
client’s decision.78 On the facts the defendant had not assumed responsibility for the claimant’s 
decision to lend the money, their instructions having been only to draft the documentation, so they 
were only responsible for confirming the claimant’s assumption about one of a number of factors 
in his assessment of the project. No loss had resulted from that incorrect assessment, since the 
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claimant would have lost his money anyway. The development would have been left incomplete, 
the loan unpaid and the property substantially worthless when it came to be sold. The loss was not 
within the scope of the solicitors’ duty but had arisen from commercial misjudgements which were 
not their concern. 
In reaching this conclusion Lord Sumption drew attention to the essential distinction drawn by Lord 
Hoffmann in his leading speech in SAAMCO, underlying the whole of his analysis, between the 
assessment of the loss caused by the breach of duty and the extent of the defendant’s duty to protect 
the claimant against it. The question it posed was whether the loss flowed from the particular feature 
of the defendant’s conduct which made it wrongful, and only at the second stage was the court 
concerned with identifying the consequences which flowed from the breach. The question was 
sometimes sought to be resolved in terms of a distinction between “advice” and “information”, but 
this had given rise to confusion because of the descriptive inadequacy of the labels. In the case of the 
former, the adviser’s duty was to consider all relevant matters and not only specific factors in the 
decision. If one matter critical to the decision was negligently misjudged, the client would in principle 
be entitled to recover the full loss from entering the transaction. His responsibility would extend to 
the decision itself. By comparison, in the “information” category, the process of identifying the 
relevant considerations and the overall assessment of the commercial merits of the transaction were 
matters for the client. The defendant’s legal responsibility did not extend to the decision itself. The 
fact that the material contributed by the defendant was known to be critical to the client’s decision 
whether to enter the transaction did not turn it into an “advice” case. Otherwise, all “no transaction” 
cases would give rise to liability for the entire foreseeable loss, the very proposition rejected in 
SAAMCO.79 
Lord Sumption recognised that the SAAMCO principle had been criticised as incoherent because it 
did not systematically exclude loss arising from collateral risks with which the defendant was not 
concerned.80 In SAAMCO itself, where the defendant valued at £15m a property worth £5m, damages 
were limited to £10m. This exceeded the whole of the loss flowing from the transaction, including the 
loss flowing from the fall in the market, and the whole of that loss was awarded. However, the 
principle depended for its application on the award of loss which was within the scope of the 
defendant’s duty, not the exclusion of loss that was outside it. In a simple case this might amount to 
the same thing. For example, it might be possible to strip out the effect of a fall in the market if that 
was the only extraneous source of loss. But where the loss arose from a variety of commercial factors 
which it was for the court to identify and assess, it would commonly be difficult or impossible to 
quantify and strip out the effect of each of them. In SAAMCO £10m was the maximum measure of the 
increased risk to which the valuer exposed the lender by getting the valuation wrong, and that sum 
provided the limit to what was recoverable by way of damages. As a tool for relating the recoverable 
damages to the scope of the duty the SAAMCO cap might be mathematically imprecise, but 
mathematical precision was not always attainable in the law of damages.81  
Lord Sumption drew attention to the decision of the House of Lords in Aneco Reinsurance 
Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd82 as falling on the other side of the line. In this case Lord 
 
79 Above n 77 at [54]-[55]. 
80 Stapleton, “Negligent Valuers and Falls in the Property Market” (1997) 113 LQR 1; Murdoch, “Negligent 
Valuers, Falling Markets and Risk Allocation’” [2000] 8 Tort Law Review 183. 
81 Above n 77 at [45]-[46]. 
82 Aneco Reinsurance Underwriting Ltd v Johnson & Higgins Ltd [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 157. 
Lloyd, giving the majority view, held that brokers (and others) could be liable in contract for the 
foreseeable consequences of their negligence, including the adverse consequences of entering into 
a transaction with a third party, provided such consequences could fairly be held to fall within the 
scope of the defendant’s duty of care. SAAMCO was an example of a special class of case — typically 
that of a valuer, but not confined to valuers — where the scope of the defendant’s duty was 
confined to the giving of specific information. But in the instant case the brokers had undertaken a 
duty to advise the plaintiffs on the availability of reinsurance cover and to obtain the cover, and 
were liable for the whole transaction loss rather than simply the loss flowing from the failure to 
obtain the reinsurance. So, as Lord Sumption observed, the critical feature of the Aneco case was that 
the broker’s representation was found to extend to the entire transaction, including the writing of the 
reinsurance itself. But his Lordship doubted whether it was helpful to describe either of Lord 
Hoffmann’s categories as “normal” or “special”. Every case was likely to depend on the range of 
matters for which the defendant assumed responsibility, and no more exact rule could be stated. 
Decisions in New Zealand, consistently with the approach taken in SAAMCO, determine whether a 
negligent defendant is liable in law for a full transaction loss by asking whether the consequences 
were of a kind which were within the risk created by the defendant’s breach of duty. Bank of New 
Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd83 provides an example. The defendant, a trustee under 
a deed charged with overseeing advances by the plaintiff bank to a property investment company, 
failed to detect irregular payments by the company to its subsidiaries. Subsequently there was a fall 
in the property market and the company went into receivership. The bank sought to recover its lost 
advances from the defendant, but the Court of Appeal held that the defendant was not liable. In cases 
of contract, tort or equitable duties the correct approach was to consider the scope of the defendant’s 
duty and the risks against which there was a duty to protect the plaintiff. It was not enough that the 
defendant’s breach created or preserved the circumstances in which the loss could be incurred. Here 
the failure to inform left the bank continuing as a lender on a false basis (that there were no unsecured 
loans), but even if true the bank’s loss would have been the same. The defendant’s duty was only to 
protect the plaintiff against loss through causes which were connected with the irregular advances 
which the defendant failed to detect. 
 
Deceitful misrepresentations 
Zurich Insurance Co Ltd v Hayward84 considers the issues of inducement and causation in claims for 
deceit. The defendant was injured at work and claimed substantial damages against his employer. 
The employer’s insurers suspected the defendant was exaggerating the extent of his injuries, but 
could not find sufficient evidence to prove this in court. They then reached an agreement to pay less 
than one third of the amount claimed in full and final settlement of the claim. The insurers later 
received proof that the defendant had in fact recovered from his injuries a year before the 
settlement, and sought to rescind the agreement and repayment of the sums paid under it. The trial 
judge held that the insurers could rescind the agreement, and assessed the quantum of damages 
payable to the defendant at less than one ninth of the sum he had received under the agreement. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant’s appeal on the ground, inter alia, that the insurers had 
not relied on the misrepresentation when they had reached the settlement agreement. The insurers 
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appealed to the Supreme Court on the questions whether the defrauded representee had to prove 
that it was induced into settlement because it believed that the misrepresentations were true, or 
whether it sufficed to establish that the fact of the misrepresentations was a material cause in 
entering into the settlement. 
 
Lord Clarke, delivering a judgment with which Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale and Lord Reed agreed, 
affirmed that it was not necessary, as a matter of law, to prove that a representee believed that the 
representation was true. But that was not to say that the representee’s state of mind might not be 
relevant to the issue of inducement. For example, if the representee did not believe that the 
representation was true, he might have serious difficulty in establishing that he was induced to enter 
into the contract or that he had suffered loss as a result. But the question in a case like the one 
before the court, involving a person in the position of the employer or its insurer who had suspicions 
as to whether the representation was true, or even was strongly of the view that it was not true, was 
not what view the employer or its insurer took but what view the court might take in due course. 
The employer and its advisers had to take into account the possibility that the defendant would be 
believed by the judge at the trial, because the views of the judge would determine the amount of 
damages awarded.85 
 
Here the amount of the settlement was very much greater than it would have been but for the 
fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant. The small amount ultimately awarded by the 
judge showed the extent of the dishonest nature of the claim. The importance of encouraging 
settlement, which was considerable, was not sufficient to allow Mr Hayward to retain moneys which 
he only obtained by fraud. His Lordship accordingly would accept the submissions made on behalf of 
Zurich in support of the proposition that belief was not required as an independent ingredient of the 
tort. It might however be relevant as part of the court’s consideration of the questions whether 
there was inducement and, if so, whether causation had been established.86 
 
Lord Clarke also accepted Zurich’s argument that, just as belief in the misrepresentation was not 
required, so also belief in other inducing causes was irrelevant. He noted that the textbooks strongly 
supported the proposition that it was sufficient for the misrepresentation to be an inducing cause 
and it was not necessary for it to be the sole cause. Indeed, there was a presumption of inducement 
where there was an intention to induce by means of fraud. While this was not a presumption of law 
but an inference of fact, it was a presumption that was very difficult to rebut. As Lord Chelmsford LC 
had observed, “can it be permitted to a party who has practised a deception, with a view to a 
particular end, which has been attained by it, to speculate upon what might have been the result if 
there had been a full communication of the truth?”87 In particular, the presumption should not be 
rebutted merely because the representee was sceptical. Otherwise, the doubting representee would 
be placed in a worse position than the gullible or trusting one. And there was no duty upon the 
defrauded representee to exercise “due diligence” to determine whether there were reasonable 
grounds to believe the representations made. Zurich did as much as it reasonably could to 
investigate the accuracy and ramifications of Mr Hayward’s representations before entering into any 
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settlement.88 
 
As to the representee’s knowledge of the falsity, Zurich submitted that whereas proof that the 
representee had knowledge (or ‘blind eye knowledge’) of the falsity sufficed, nothing short of that 
availed the misrepresentor. Lord Clarke said that since Zurich did not have full knowledge, it was not 
necessary to express a final view. But he thought there might be circumstances in which a 
representee might know that the representation was false but nevertheless might be held to rely 
upon the misrepresentation as a matter of fact. The very case could be an example. The trial judge 
had recognised that sometimes (a staged road traffic ‘accident’ for example) the other party might 
actually be certain from his own direct knowledge that the statement was a deliberate lie. But even 
then he and his advisers could not choose to ignore it; they had still to take into account the risk that 
it would be believed by the judge at trial. The situation was quite different from a proposed 
purchase, where if in doubt one could simply walk away.89 
 
Lord Toulson, giving a concurring judgment, recognised that Mr Hayward’s deceitful conduct was 
intended to influence the mind of the insurers, not necessarily by causing them to believe him, but 
by causing them to value his litigation claim more highly than it was worth if the true facts had been 
disclosed, because the value of a claim for insurers’ purposes is that which the court is likely put on 
it. He achieved his dishonest purpose and thereby induced them to act to their detriment by paying 
almost ten times more than they would have paid but for his dishonesty. It did not lie in his mouth in 
those circumstances to say that they should have taken the case to trial, and it would not accord 
with justice or public policy for the law to put the insurers in a worse position as regards setting 
aside the settlement than they would have been in, if the case had proceeded to trial and had been 
decided in accordance with the corrupted medical evidence as it then was.90 
 
Zurich illustrates the stringency of the rules governing deceit as compared to those governing 
negligence. It confirms that the plaintiff must have been influenced by the misrepresentation, but it 
need not have been the sole cause. There is no question as to the scope of the defendant’s duty, and 
the issue is simply one of causation. Did the defendant’s misrepresentation in fact induce entry into 
an agreement? If the answer is yes, the question of remoteness of damage can arise. In cases 
governed by the former s 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, now s 35 of the Contract and 
Commercial Law Act 2017, concerning statements inducing a contract between the representor and 
the representee, the contract test laid down in Hadley v Baxendale applies, and this requires, 
broadly, that the loss should arise in the usual course of things or should be such as may reasonably 
be supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of the 
breach.91 However, in an action for deceit, Smith New Court Securities v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset 
Management) Ltd92  held that the test is whether the damage flows directly from the fraudulent 
inducement. This is a stringent test which allows for greater recovery than in negligence. In Smith 
New Court Securities itself the House of Lords affirmed that a plaintiff who had been induced to 
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purchase property by fraud had to give credit for any benefits he or she had received as a result of 
the transaction, that the general rule was that the benefits included the market value of the 
property as at the date of acquisition, but that such general rule was not to be inflexibly applied 
where to do so would prevent the plaintiff from obtaining full compensation for the wrong suffered. 
Accordingly damages for fraudulently inducing the purchase of shares were assessed not by 
reference to the shares’ current market value at the time of acquisition, but by taking into account 
an unconnected and then undiscovered fraud which, if known about, would have considerably 
reduced their value. 
 
The malicious institution of civil proceedings 
Should a person who maliciously institutes civil proceedings without any reasonable and probable 
cause be held liable in the same way as the malicious prosecutor in criminal proceedings? Early case 
law in England is equivocal, but the decision of the House of Lords in Gregory v Portsmouth City 
Council93 in 2000 specifically rejected it. However, in Crawford Adjusters v Sagicor General Insurance 
(Cayman) Ltd94 the Privy Council, in a three to two majority decision,95 upheld the action. Then in 
Willers v Joyce96 the same question arose for determination by the United Kingdom Supreme Court, 
and, this time by a five to four majority, it was again resolved in favour of allowing the action.  
The claimant was employed by the defendant for over 20 years until he was dismissed in 2009. The 
claimant was a director of a company (L Ltd) which had brought and abandoned a claim against 
another company, and L Ltd had then sued the claimant for alleged breaches of duty causing it to 
incur the costs in pursuing the earlier claim. The claimant defended the action, which was 
discontinued before trial, and L Ltd was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs. The claimant then sued 
the defendant for malicious institution of proceedings, alleging that L Ltd was controlled by the 
defendant, that it had brought the earlier claim on the defendant’s instructions, and that L Ltd’s 
claim against him had been brought without reasonable cause, had been determined in his favour, 
had been actuated by malice and had caused him to suffer loss. The ingredients of the action, if it 
existed, not being in dispute, the question for the Court was whether the malicious prosecution of 
civil proceedings was a tort known to English law. 
Lord Toulson (with whom Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord Clarke agreed97) recognised 
that the early case law was capable of more than one respectable interpretation, and it might be 
that there never was a time when there was a general understanding precisely where the 
boundaries of the tort lay.98 Accordingly, turning to policy, he found it instinctively unjust for a 
person to suffer injury as a result of the malicious institution of proceedings for which there was no 
reasonable ground and yet not be entitled to compensation for the injury intentionally caused by the 
person responsible for it. The question then was whether any possible counter-arguments ought to 
prevail. His Lordship set out a number of contentions to this effect, but felt able to reject them all.  
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First, the floodgates argument, that a good claim should not be allowed because it might lead to 
someone else pursuing a bad one, was not generally attractive. Second, the suggestion that the tort 
might deter those with valid civil claims from pursuing them through fear of a vindictive claim 
against them had been rejected in the case of criminal proceedings,99 and had no greater merit here. 
Third, there was a public interest in avoiding unnecessary satellite litigation, whether in criminal or 
civil matters, but, again, that had not been a sufficient reason for disallowing claims for the malicious 
prosecution of criminal proceedings. Further, the action did not amount to a collateral attack on the 
outcome of the first proceedings (save for a point about a claim for costs, discussed below). Fourth, 
there was no duplication of remedies, and Crawford and the present case showed that injustices 
arising from groundless and damaging civil proceedings could not be addressed by way of other 
torts. Fifth, the action was not inconsistent with witness immunity from civil liability. An action 
against a defendant for damages for malicious prosecution after giving false evidence was not 
brought on or in respect of the evidence but in respect of the prosecution. Sixth, there was no 
inconsistency between the absence of a duty of care owed by a litigant to towards the opposing 
party and imposing a liability for maliciously instituting proceedings with reasonable cause. The 
distinction between careless and intentional conduct was a familiar feature of parts of the common 
law. Seventh, the tort should not be confined to persons exercising the coercive power of the state. 
Malicious prosecution was not a public law tort, and it would be incorrect to see it as having any of 
the characteristics of a public law remedy. Eighth, there was a question whether for reasons of 
reciprocity there should be an action for a maliciously instituted defence, which raised other and 
wider considerations.100 There was an obvious distinction between the initiation of the legal process 
itself and later steps which might involve bad faith (for which the court was able to impose 
sanctions) but did not go to the root of the institution of legal process. Last, it was suggested that 
there was uncertainty as to the meaning of malice. However, the critical feature which had to be 
proved was that the proceedings were not a bona fide use of the court’s process. Accordingly, all 
things considered, his Lordship considered that the suggested countervailing considerations were 
not sufficient to outweigh the argument that simple justice dictated a remedy for the claimant.101 
A further point made by Lord Toulson concerned costs. The notion that a costs order had made good 
the injury caused by the prosecution of a malicious claim was almost certainly a fiction, and the 
court should try if possible to avoid fictions, especially where they resulted in substantial injustice. 
So his Lordship did not regard the claim in the instant case to recover excess costs as an abuse of 
process.102 
The four dissentients - Lord Mance, Lord Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Reed - each delivered a 
judgment. As regards the authorities, their Lordships were satisfied that they did not support the 
wider action.103 As regards policy, Lord Neuberger conveniently summarised a substantial number of 
concerns, and came to opposite conclusions from those favoured by Lord Toulson. In particular, his 
Lordship thought that the new tort would be inconsistent with the general rule that a litigant owes 
no duty to an opponent in the conduct of civil litigation, and also with the rule that even a perjuring 
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witness in court proceedings was absolutely immune from civil liability. Next, the original 
justification for the tort in the criminal context, that it was a tool for constraining the arbitrary 
exercise of the powers of public prosecuting authorities or private persons exercising corresponding 
functions, did not apply in the ordinary civil context. In the non-criminal context this was limited to 
cases where the court was invited by the potential defendant to exercise ex parte or interlocutory 
powers which resulted in the claimant losing his liberty or property without the prior opportunity 
properly to defend himself. That was no basis for extending it to civil proceedings generally. Further, 
the precise ambit of the tort would be both uncertain and very wide, potentially extending to a 
malicious defence and malicious applications or allegations in proceedings which would otherwise 
not be malicious. Other concerns included the risks of satellite litigation and unanticipated knock-on 
effects, problems related to defendants wishing to invoke a right to privilege in relation to any 
document in connection with the allegedly malicious proceedings, a possible chilling effect on the 
bringing or defending of civil proceedings, and real problems involved both in identifying what 
constituted malice and in deciding what types of loss and damage should be recoverable in 
connection with claims based on the proposed tort. So his Lordship would have held that a tort such 
as that argued for by the appellants should not be recognised in the courts of England and Wales.104 
Let us consider how the decision in Willers compares to relevant decisions elsewhere. By far the 
most extensive consideration of the issue is found in decisions of the courts of the United States. A 
leading academic text starts its discussion with the statement that “Wrongful institution of a civil 
action is actionable under rules similar to those for malicious prosecution of a criminal 
proceeding”.105 However, the position is more nuanced than is apparent from that bald statement, 
as is made clear by the explanation of the rule and the exceptions and limitations that apply to it 
that are found in the following paragraphs of the text. In the Crawford Adjusters case in the Privy 
Council Lord Neuberger, in his dissenting judgment, undertook a close analysis of the United States 
experience and noted significant differences between the position in the United States and in 
England. His Lordship recognised that in England, as a general rule, the loser paid the winner’s costs 
and that this was a deterrent to groundless actions. By contrast, in the United States, there was no 
such general power, and this absence had played a part in the extension of the tort of malicious 
prosecution to all civil proceedings. Further, the American rule required that the previous 
proceedings should have caused “special injury”, being something more than the expense, distress 
and reputational loss that was ordinarily suffered as a result of wrongful litigation.106 In his 
Lordship’s opinion, the various established exceptions to the rule that the tort of malicious 
prosecution did not extend to civil proceedings - the action for maliciously presenting a winding up 
petition,107 procuring a search warrant without reasonable cause108 or a bench warrant of arrest,109 
maliciously setting in train a process of execution against property,110 maliciously procuring the 
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arrest of a ship111 - were satisfactorily explained and justified by this requirement. They all involved 
ex parte or interlocutory orders improperly procured by the person initiating the proceedings, in 
circumstances where in the nature of things there would never be a final order. So any loss would be 
“special injury” which was not part of the normal detriment caused by litigation.112 
After reviewing the cases Lord Neuberger had no doubt that there was support both for maintaining 
the English rule in Gregory and also for adopting the American rule in the United States 
jurisprudence. However, he considered that there were four specific reasons why the United States 
experience supported a denial of the action. First, even in a jurisdiction where successful defendants 
rarely could expect to recover their costs, there seemed to be as strong judicial support for the 
English Rule as for the American Rule. Secondly, it was clear that departing from the English Rule 
would have the disadvantage of potentially confusing the law, causing unnecessary uncertainty. 
Thirdly, and more marginally, the United States jurisprudence, with its “special injury” requirement 
in the English Rule, justified on a principled basis what would otherwise appear to be anomalous 
exceptions to the principle that a claim in malicious prosecution could not be based on civil 
proceedings. Fourthly, the United States jurisprudence provided a reminder that wrongful civil 
litigation should not be viewed in isolation. The courts had procedural mechanisms at their disposal 
to preserve and strengthen the civil litigation process, and to target proceedings brought wrongfully 
or mistakenly.113 
 
In New Zealand there has been a degree of support for the action, although no final decision in 
favour. In New Zealand Social Credit Political League Inc v O’Brien,114 Cooke J favoured recognising 
an action in respect of maliciously instituted civil proceedings, although the question did not need to 
be decided in that case. Again, in Rawlinson v Purnell, Jenkinson & Roscoe115 Hammond J accepted 
that New Zealand law might recognise the tort, although he considered that the question could only 
be finally resolved by a higher court.116 Its elements, by analogy to malicious prosecution, were that 
the defendant had advanced a civil cause against the plaintiff, the cause had been resolved in the 
plaintiff’s favour, the defendant had no reasonable and probable cause for bringing the proceedings, 
the defendant acted maliciously in instituting or continuing the proceedings, and damage of a kind 
for which the law would allow recompense had been caused. However, his Honour held that the 
instant claim had to fail, because the jury had decided that the defendant had acted incompetently 
but not maliciously. Further, and most recently, in Robinson v Whangarei Heads Enterprises Ltd 
Heath J held, in the light of Crawford Adjusters, that a claim for malicious prosecution of civil 
proceedings should be permitted to proceed,117 and at the trial itself Gilbert J held that the claim 
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should indeed be recognised as alleging a tort.118 However, it failed on the facts as the plaintiff could 
not prove that the defendant had acted with malice. 
It is apparent from this brief overview that relevant authorities point in different directions and are 
susceptible to differing interpretation. But ultimately the determination of the question at stake in 
Willers depends on an assessment of the strength of the competing requirements of policy. The 
background to the question in the early cases provides no conclusive answer, and in any event the 
decision needs to meet the demands of good policy today. The choice is finely balanced, as the split 
of opinion in both Crawford Adjusters and Willers well indicates. However, some of the objections of 
the dissentients - the deterrence of good actions, the risk of satellite litigation, the impact on witness 
immunity - seemingly could be levelled at the established action for the malicious prosecution of 
criminal proceedings, and others - excessive uncertainty, unanticipated knock-on effects - may prove 
to be largely unfounded or at least manageable. The difficulty is that the impact of the identified 
dangers must to some extent be speculative, and the majority view that justice demanded a remedy 
for the claimant certainly carries resonance. So the majority view, by a narrow margin, deserves to 
carry the day. 
Developments in the law of vicarious liability 
A spate of decisions in common law courts around the world concerning the law of vicarious liability 
shows no signs of coming to an end.  In Various Claimants v The Catholic Child Welfare Society119 
(hereafter Christian Brothers) the UK Supreme Court accepted and endorsed earlier decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, notably Bazley v Curry,120 in holding (i) a relationship “analogous to 
employment” between the wrongdoer and the defendant, and (ii) a “close connection” between the 
wrongdoing and the relationship, could found the imposition of liability. Both of these elements 
have been scrutinised further in recent cases. 
Relationships analogous to employment 
In Christian Brothers the question  was whether the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools 
(the Institute), founded by Jean-Baptiste De La Salle in 1680, was responsible for sexual and physical 
abuse of children committed by its brothers at a residential institute for boys (St William’s) who 
were in need of care and protection. The Institute did not employ the brothers at St William’s but it 
sent its brothers to teach there. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between the Institute 
and the brothers had the same incidents as that of a contract of employment and could properly 
give rise to vicarious liability, on the ground that it was “akin to that between an employer and an 
employee”.121 Then in Cox v Ministry of Justice,122 a later decision of the UK Supreme Court applying 
the principle, the UK Ministry of Justice was held vicariously liable for the negligence of a prisoner 
assisting with work in the prison kitchen who dropped a heavy bag of rice onto the prison catering 
manager and injured her. The prisoner was not an employee of the prison authority, but when 
prisoners worked in the prison their activities formed part of the operation of the prison and were of 
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direct and immediate benefit to the prison service itself. The relationship accordingly was analogous 
to an employment relationship.123 
The recent decision at first instance in England in Various Claimants v Barclays Bank plc124 well 
illustrates how the ambit of the qualifying relationship is expanding. In this case 126 claimants 
sought damages against Barclays Bank (“the Bank”) in respect of alleged sexual assaults to which 
they were subjected by a Dr Gordon Bates.  At the time of the alleged assaults the majority of the 
claimants were applicants for employment with the Bank, and a small number were existing 
employees.  Each claimant was required to attend the home of Dr Bates, where he had a consulting 
room and where he carried out medical assessments. Dr Bates was alleged to have sexually 
assaulted each of the claimants in the course of carrying out such assessments on behalf of the 
Bank.  The claimants argued that the Bank was vicariously liable for Dr Bates’ sexual assaults, on the 
basis that the relationship between the Bank and Dr Bates was akin to a relationship of employment 
and that there was a close connection between the conduct and the relationship. The Bank argued 
that Dr Bates (who had died 8 years earlier) was an independent contractor.  
Nicola Davies J upheld the claims. At stage 1 of the inquiry, her Ladyship sought to determine 
whether the relevant relationship was one of employment or “akin to employment”, by applying the 
five criteria identified by Lord Phillips in Christian Brothers.125 They are:  
(i) The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate the victim than the employee 
and can be expected to have insured against that liability; (ii) The tort will have been committed 
as a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer; (iii) The employee’s 
activity is likely to be part of the business activity of the employer; (iv) The employer, by 
employing the employee to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed 
by the employee; (v) The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the 
control of the employer. 
Her Ladyship considered that these factors all pointed towards the imposition of liability on the 
Bank. (i) The claimants’ only legal recourse was against the Bank, and it or its insurers had the means 
to meet the claims. (ii) The medical examinations were required by the Bank, with no choice as to 
the examining doctor being given to an applicant. The Bank made the necessary arrangements and 
paid for the examinations. The work was done for benefit of the Bank and on its behalf. (iii) The 
purpose of the pre-employment medical examination emanated solely from the Bank, enabling it to 
satisfy itself that an employee was physically suitable for the work which they were employed to do. 
It was of no health benefit to the individual concerned. In providing the assessment Dr Bates was an 
integral part of the business activities of bank. (iv) Many of the claimants were young girls, who were 
directed by the Bank to be seen and physically examined by a doctor they did not know at that 
doctor’s home. In these circumstances the Bank created the risk of the tortious conduct which was 
allegedly committed by Dr Bates; (v) The Bank was directional in identifying the questions to be 
asked and the examinations to be carried out. The control was of a higher level of prescription than 
might usually be found in the context of an examination required to be performed by a doctor. 
Control also was manifested in the claimants being directed to the particular doctor without any 
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choice in the matter. In light of all these factors her Ladyship was satisfied that the relevant criteria 
were met.126 
At stage 2, the question was whether the tort was sufficiently closely connected with the 
employment or quasi-employment (the nature of which question is examined further below). Nicola 
Davies J thought that it was difficult to see how it could sensibly be argued that Dr Bates’ acts did 
not fall within the activity tasked to him. He was a doctor who was likely to be viewed by young 
women as being in authority, not least because he was the doctor chosen by the claimants’ 
employer or prospective employer to carry out a medical examination relating to their employment. 
The abuse took place when the doctor was engaged in the duties at the time and place required by 
the Bank. On these facts her Ladyship found that the abuse was inextricably interwoven with Dr 
Bates’ duties, and the requirement of a close connection with the employment or engagement was 
satisfied.127 
The decision in Barclays Bank makes another inroad into the orthodox rule that an employer is not 
vicariously liable for the tort of an independent contractor. Nicola Davies J makes no specific finding 
as to Dr Bates’ status, referring only to his “employment or quasi-employment”. Of course, if Dr 
Bates was the bank’s employee the problem disappears, but in that case there would be no need to 
apply the criteria laid down in Christian Brothers. But if, as seems clear, he was an independent 
contractor, the orthodox rule has to be qualified by the significant possibility that the relationship 
may nonetheless be analogous to one of employment. This throws into doubt much orthodox law 
identifying and applying the distinction between employees and independent contractors. In 
Christian Brothers and similar cases the wrongdoer at least held a position which was functionally 
analogous to employment, for example as regards the wrongdoer’s accountability to the relevant 
organisation, integration into its structure, and performance of duties aimed at pursuing its 
fundamental aims and objectives on its behalf. Dr Bates carried on his own business as a general 
medical practitioner, and it is hard to see his position as regards the bank as analogous. 
An alternative argument, not advanced in Barclays Bank, is that the bank could have been held to be 
under a non-delegable duty to take care. It would need to be established, applying Woodland v Essex 
County Council,128  that the bank had assumed an antecedent protective relationship with the victims 
of the abuse, which perhaps was possible on the facts of the particular case. 
A close connection between the relationship and the wrongdoing 
In Christian Brothers the UK Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the House of Lords in Lister v 
Hesley Hall Ltd,129 an earlier sexual abuse case, that a test asking whether there was a “close 
connection” between the relationship and the abuse should be applied. The Court also took a 
further step and held, adopting the approach taken in Bazley v Curry,130 that there needed to be 
proof that the defendant caused a material increase in the risk that abuse would occur. By 
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comparison, the decision of the High Court of Australia in New South Wales v Lepore131 was out of 
step with these developments. In this case Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, relying on Bazley and Lister, were 
prepared to accept that an institution might be held vicariously liable for sexual abuse committed by 
a teacher. However, the other members of the court took different and contrasting views. Gaudron J 
considered that the only principled basis upon which vicarious liability could be imposed for 
deliberate criminal conduct was that the defendant was estopped from asserting that the person 
whose acts were in question was not acting as his or her servant, agent or representative when the 
acts occurred. Gummow and Hayne JJ, in a joint judgment, considered that recovery against the 
employer in the case of an intentional tort should be limited to where the conduct was done in the 
intended pursuit of the employer’s interests or the apparent execution of the authority which the 
employer held out the employee as having, and there was not the slightest semblance of proper 
authority to sexually assault a pupil. Callinan J thought that claims of abuse had to fail because 
deliberate criminal misconduct lay outside, and usually far outside, the scope or course of an 
employed teacher’s duty. However, an alternative analysis favoured by McHugh J was that sexual 
abuse by a teacher of a child amounted to a breach of a non-delegable duty owed by the institution 
to the child. 
In Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC132 the High Court of Australia recognised that, as a result of the 
differing views expressed in Lepore, there was a need to look at the question again and to provide 
some guidance to lower courts. French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, in a joint judgment,133 
noted that the decisions in Canada and the United Kingdom had developed tests which had regard 
to the connection between the wrongful act concerned and the employment and, in the United 
Kingdom, to what a judge determined to be fair and just. These new tests of connection were 
devised not only to provide an explanation for cases of the kind to which they were initially 
addressed – involving the sexual abuse of children in educational, residential or care facilities by 
employees having special positions with respect to the children – but also to serve as a basis for 
vicarious liability which might apply more generally. But general principle of that kind depended 
upon policy choices and the allocation of risk, which were matters upon which minds might differ.  
An acceptable general basis for liability had eluded the common law of Australia, and it was well for 
the present to continue with the orthodox route of considering whether the approach taken in 
decided cases furnished a solution to further cases as they arose.  This had the advantage of 
consistency in what might, at some time in the future, develop into principle.  And it had the 
advantage of being likely to identify factors which pointed toward liability and by that means 
provided explanation and guidance for future litigation.134 
On this approach, their Honours considered that the key was to be found in the words of Dixon J in 
Deatons Pty Ltd v Flew,135 that vicarious liability might arise where the employment provided the 
“occasion” for the wrongful act. The fact that a wrongful act was a criminal offence did not preclude 
the possibility of vicarious liability. It was possible for a criminal offence to be an act for which the 
apparent performance of employment provided the occasion.  Conversely, the fact that employment 
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afforded an opportunity for the commission of the act was not of itself a sufficient reason to attract 
vicarious liability. Even so, the role given to the employee and the nature of the employee's 
responsibilities might justify the conclusion that the employment not only provided an opportunity 
but also was the occasion for the commission of the wrongful act.  By way of example, it might be 
sufficient to hold an employer vicariously liable for a criminal act committed by an employee where, 
in the commission of that act, the employee used or took advantage of the position in which the 
employment placed the employee vis-à-vis the victim.136 
Consequently, in cases of this kind, the court should consider any special role that the employer had 
assigned to the employee and the position in which the employee was thereby placed vis-à-vis the 
victim.  In determining whether the apparent performance of such a role might be said to give the 
"occasion" for the wrongful act, particular features might be taken into account.  They included 
authority, power, trust, control and the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim.  The latter feature 
might be especially important.  Where, in such circumstances, the employee took advantage of his 
or her position with respect to the victim, that might suffice to determine that the wrongful act 
should be regarded as committed in the course or scope of employment and as such render the 
employer vicariously liable.137 
The instant case concerned a claim by a former pupil at the Prince Alfred College (PAC) in respect of 
the sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of a housemaster, one Bain, employed by PAC. The abuse 
had happened many years earlier, and after it came to light the claimant accepted a settlement of 
money offered by PAC. But after his psychiatric condition worsened and his financial situation 
became desperate he changed his mind and sought to have the limitation period for bringing an 
action extended. The High Court held that permission should not be granted, and also that no 
finding on liability could or should have been made due to deficiencies in the available evidence. The 
relevant approach required a careful examination of the role the PAC actually assigned to 
housemasters and the position in which Bain was placed vis-à-vis the claimant and the other 
children. Much of the evidence necessary to a determination had been lost, and the PAC would be 
prejudiced in various ways if it were required to defend an action at this late juncture.138 
Whether the distinction drawn by the High Court between the employment providing the “occasion” 
for and the “opportunity” for the abuse is a real one is doubtful. The words can be, and are, used 
interchangeably. The idea of a close connection based upon the creation of a risk is preferable, for it 
is clear that the nature of the abuser’s job and the tasks he is given or authorised to carry out are 
pivotal in determining whether the test is satisfied. Yet the High Court certainly recognised that such 
employment-created risk was the focus of the inquiry, apparently seeing this as inherent in its 
favoured test. However, while the test to be applied in Australia is at least similar, the High Court 
disagreed with the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets 
plc139 on how it ought to be applied on the facts of that case. 
In Mohamud the defendant employer was held to be vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, 
a petrol pump attendant, who had abused the claimant, a Somali man who had come into the petrol 
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station kiosk to make an inquiry, using foul, racist and threatening language and then subjecting him 
to a violent assault. Their Lordships upheld the claim, reasoning that it was the employee’s job to 
attend to customers and to respond to their inquiries. His conduct in answering the claimant’s request 
in a foul mouthed way and ordering him to leave was inexcusable, but it was within the “field of 
activities” assigned to him. The assault that followed was all part of a seamless episode. The employee 
grossly abused his position, but his conduct was in connection with the business in which he was 
employed to serve customers. His employers entrusted him with that position and it was just that as 
between them and the claimant, they should be held responsible for their employee’s abuse of it.140 
In essence, then, the Supreme Court took the view that the employment or task of the employee 
created the risk of the abusive conduct, because the employment involved dealing with customers 
and the assault occurred as part of that dealing. However, in Prince Alfred the High Court of Australia 
rejected the decision, because the role assigned to the employee in that case did not provide the 
occasion for the wrongful acts which the employee committed outside the kiosk on the forecourt of 
the petrol station.  What occurred after the victim left the kiosk was relevantly unconnected with 
the employee's employment.141  
We can perhaps agree with the High Court on this point. It is hard to see the racist assault as being 
connected with the wrongdoer’s employment. The Supreme Court emphasised that what occurred 
was a “seamless” series of events, but the whole episode, including the initial encounter in the kiosk, 
very arguably was attributable simply to the employee’s racism, not his employment. Let us change 
the facts and suppose the employee saw a Somali man passing in the street and ran out and 
assaulted him for racist reasons.  The result seemingly would have been different, yet there does not 
appear to be any substantive difference as regards the connection with his employment. As it stands 
the decision in Mohamud seems apt, or at least has the potential, to render an employer liable for 
anything an employee may do at work and on the employer’s premises.   
Vicarious liability and non-delegable duties 
In its latest decision the UK Supreme Court in Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council142 has 
considered both the ambit of the doctrine of vicarious liability and the circumstances giving rise to 
the imposition of a non-delegable duty to take care. In this case the defendant local authority had 
taken the claimant into care when she was aged seven and had placed her with foster parents. The 
claimant initially was physically and emotionally abused by the foster mother, and when she was 
placed with second foster parents she was sexually abused by the foster father. At the trial of the 
action Males J held that the local authority was not responsible for the tortious conduct of the foster 
parents, either on the basis of vicarious liability or on the basis of a non-delegable duty of care,143 
and this decision was affirmed in the Court of Appeal.144 The claimant appealed from this decision to 
the Supreme Court, which affirmed that the authority did not owe a non-delegable duty to take care 
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but, by a majority, allowed the appeal on the ground that the authority was vicariously liability for 
the foster parents’ abuse. 
Lord Reed, delivering a judgment with which Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord Clarke agreed, said that 
there could not be any rationale for imposing vicarious liability on a defendant where he was directly 
liable for the harm caused by the third party. It therefore made sense to consider the scope of the 
defendant’s own duties before considering whether vicarious liability might exist. Tortious liabilities 
based not on personal fault but on a duty to ensure that care was taken were exceptional, and had 
to be kept within reasonable limits. The non-delegable duties owed by employers to employees and 
schools to pupils were well-known examples, and the question which arose in the present case was 
whether local authorities had an analogous duty to ensure that care was taken, in the upbringing of 
children in their care, to protect their safety.145 
In answering this question, Lord Reed referred first to Woodland v Essex County Council,146 where, as 
already noted, Lord Sumption identified the assumption by the defendant of an antecedent 
protective relationship with the claimant as giving rise to the duty. Its characteristic features 
included the assumption by the defendant of a positive duty to protect the claimant from harm, and 
the delegation by the defendant to a third party of some function which was an integral part of the 
positive duty which he had assumed towards the claimant. Lord Reed regarded Lord Sumption’s 
criteria as being intended to identify circumstances in which the imposition of a non-delegable duty 
was fair, just and reasonable. Like other judicial statements, the relevant criteria might need to be 
re-considered, and possibly refined, in particular contexts. That did not, however, mean that it was 
routinely necessary for the judge to determine what would be fair and just as a second stage of the 
analysis. In relation to vicarious liability, having recourse to a separate inquiry into what was fair, just 
and reasonable was not only unnecessarily duplicative, but was also apt to give rise to uncertainty 
and inconsistency. The critical question in the present case was whether the function of providing 
the child with day-to-day care, in the course of which the abuse occurred, was one which the local 
authority were themselves under a duty to perform with care for the safety of the child, or was one 
which they were merely bound to arrange to have performed, subject to a duty to take care in 
making and supervising those arrangements. 
In the instant case, section 10 of the Child Care Act 1980 (UK) conferred or imposed upon a local 
authority, in relation to a child in their care, the powers and duties which a parent or guardian would 
have by virtue of their relationship to a child of which they were the parent or guardian: that is to 
say, the powers and duties which they had by reason of their status. Those powers and duties, which 
were many and various, included the general duty to safeguard and promote the child’s health, 
development and welfare, and the right to direct, control or guide the child’s upbringing. Should 
these parental powers and duties be construed as imposing a tortious duty not merely to take care 
for the safety of the child, but to ensure that care was taken? There was ample authority that the 
duty of a parent, or of a person exercising temporary care of a child in loco parentis, was a duty to 
take reasonable care.147 But there were no authorities suggesting that parents, or persons with 
analogous responsibilities, were required not merely to take personal care for their children’s safety, 
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but to ensure that reasonable care was taken by anyone else to whom the safety of the children 
might be entrusted. There were good reasons for adopting that approach in a domestic setting. If, 
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care by the parents, the law of tort were to hold them 
liable if their child were injured because of a lack of care on the part of the nanny or the babysitter, 
or if the child were abused by a friend or a grandparent, that would be liable to interfere with 
ordinary aspects of family life which were often in the best interests of children themselves.148 
Although there were differences between the position of local authorities and that of parents, 
children in care had the same needs as other children. If, however, local authorities which 
reasonably decided that it was in the best interests of children in care to allow them to stay with 
their families or friends were to be held strictly liable for any want of due care on the part of those 
persons, the law of tort would risk creating a conflict between the local authority’s statutory duties 
to give first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children under s 18 
of the 1980 Act and their interests in avoiding exposure to such liability. And since a non-delegable 
duty would render the local authority strictly liable for the tortious acts of the child’s own parents or 
relatives, the effect of a care order, followed by the placement of the child with his or her family, 
would be a form of state insurance for the actions of the child’s family members, friends, relatives 
and babysitters. Furthermore, s 21 of the Act required the local authority to “discharge” their duty 
to provide accommodation and maintenance for a child in their care in whichever of certain 
specified ways they thought fit, or by making such other arrangements as seemed appropriate. The 
implication of the word “discharge” was that the placement of the child constituted the 
performance of the local authority’s duty to provide accommodation and maintenance. It followed 
that the local authority did not delegate performance of that duty to the persons with whom the 
child was placed. This was difficult to reconcile with the idea that, when the foster parents provided 
daily care to the child placed with them, they were performing a function which remained 
incumbent on the local authority. It suggested that the duty of the local authority was not to 
perform the function in the course of which the claimant was abused (namely, the provision of daily 
care), but rather to arrange for, and then monitor, its performance.149 
For these various reasons Lord Reed concluded that the proposition that a local authority was under 
a duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken for the safety of children in care, while they were in 
the care and control of foster parents, was too broad, and that the responsibility with which it fixed 
local authorities was too demanding. He therefore reached the same conclusion as the Court of 
Appeal on this aspect of the case, although for somewhat different reasons. His Lordship added that 
he was unable to agree with Burnett LJ’s view, that if there was no vicarious liability for an assault 
upon a child in care, then the common law should not impose liability via the route of a non-
delegable duty.150 That was to conflate two distinct legal doctrines with different incidents and 
different rationales, and to misunderstand the relationship between them. As explained earlier, it 
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was the imposition of vicarious liability which was implicitly premised on the absence of direct 
liability.151 
Turning to the question of vicarious liability, Lord Reed recognised that Christian Brothers152 and 
Cox153 held that the doctrine could apply where a relationship had certain incidents similar to those 
found in employment, subject to there being a sufficient connection between that relationship and 
the commission of the tort in question.154 His Lordship accordingly sought to apply that approach to 
the circumstances of the instant case. 
Considering first the relationship between the activity of the foster parents and that of the local 
authority, the relevant activity of the authority was the care of children who had been committed to 
their care, whereas the foster parents could not be regarded as carrying on an independent business 
of their own. The picture presented was not without complexity but, considered as a whole, it 
pointed towards the conclusion that the foster parents provided care to the child as an integral part 
of the local authority’s organisation of its child care services. If one stood back from the minutiae of 
daily life and considered the local authority’s statutory responsibilities and the manner in which they 
were discharged, it was impossible to draw a sharp line between the activity of the local authority, 
who were responsible for the care of the child and the promotion of her welfare, and that of the 
foster parents, whom they recruited and trained, and with whom they placed the child, in order for 
her to receive care in the setting which they considered would best promote her welfare. In these 
circumstances, it could properly be said that the torts committed against the claimant were 
committed by the foster parents in the course of an activity carried on for the benefit of the local 
authority.155 
Considering next the issue of risk creation, the local authority’s placement of children in their care 
with foster parents created a relationship of authority and trust between the foster parents and the 
children, in circumstances where close control could not be exercised by the local authority, and so 
rendered the children particularly vulnerable to abuse. If public bodies responsible for decision-
making in relation to children in care considered it advantageous to place them in foster care, 
notwithstanding the inherent risk that some children might be abused, it could be considered fair 
that they should compensate the unfortunate children for whom that risk materialised, particularly 
bearing in mind that the children had no control over the decision regarding their placement. In that 
way, the burden of a risk borne in the general interest was shared, rather than being borne solely by 
the victims.156 
So far as the issue of control was concerned, while the foster parents controlled the organisation 
and management of their household to the extent permitted by the relevant law and practice, and 
dealt with most aspects of the daily care of the children without immediate supervision, it would be 
mistaken to regard them as being in much the same position as ordinary parents. The local authority 
exercised powers of approval, inspection, supervision and removal without any parallel in ordinary 
family life. By virtue of those powers, the local authority exercised a significant degree of control 
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over both what the foster parents did and how they did it, in order to ensure that the children’s 
needs were met.157 
In relation to the remaining issue, that of the ability to satisfy an award of damages, vicarious liability 
was only of practical relevance in situations where (1) the principal tortfeasor could not be found or 
was not worth suing, and (2) the person sought to be made vicariously liable was able to 
compensate the victim of the tort. Those conditions were satisfied in the present context. Most 
foster parents had insufficient means to be able to meet a substantial award of damages, and were 
unlikely to have (or to be able to obtain) insurance against their own propensity to criminal 
behaviour. The local authorities which engaged them could more easily compensate the victims of 
injuries which were often serious and long-lasting.158 
Lord Reed was, therefore, satisfied that consideration of these various factors pointed towards 
vicarious liability of the local authority for the torts committed by the foster parents in the 
circumstances of the case. The claimant’s appeal accordingly should be allowed. 
Lord Hughes, in a dissenting judgment, respectfully agreed with Lord Reed as to the possibility of the 
local authority being under a non-delegable duty of care, but found the debate about vicarious 
liability a good deal more difficult. His Lordship considered that foster parents could not sensibly be 
described as akin to employees: they looked, if the business model was to be used, a great deal 
more like independent contractors, carefully selected and supervised as many a panel of such 
contractors was. The five Christian Brothers factors could not be applied mechanically, and an overall 
view of the justice, fairness and reasonableness of imposing vicarious liability might still be 
necessary. In the present case, the third factor (business activity) did not apply. The first (deep 
pockets or insurance) could not by itself be a principled ground for vicarious liability and tended to 
be circular. The fourth (creation of risk) would in practice apply to virtually all situations in which A 
asked or authorised B to deal in some manner with C. The principally relevant factors would seem to 
be factors 2 (integration), and 5 (control). While a focus on these factors could be seen as pointing 
towards vicarious liability, when one looked in greater detail at the legal and practical shape of 
fostering, the position became much less clear.159 
Lord Hughes recognised that there was a spectrum of situations in which the children’s services of a 
local authority might concern themselves with the welfare of children and families in their area, and 
in particular with where the children should live. Children could be placed for accommodation 
pursuant to various statutory provisions with, amongst others, foster carers or parents, natural 
parents, and relatives and friends. It followed that if vicarious liability applied to “ordinary” foster 
parents, on the basis that they were doing the local authority’s business, then it should apply also to 
placements with parents, family and friends. Yet what the local authority did, in all cases, whether 
involving family and friends or strangers, was to take responsibility for making decisions about 
where the children should live, and then monitoring the progress with a view to changing the 
arrangements if they did not benefit the children. This was much the more realistic way of looking at 
the functions of the local authority and the relationship between it and foster parents. The detailed 
controls which the authority exercised, and which were apt at first sight to suggest analogy to 
employment, were in reality decisions about where the children should live. Once the decision to 
place had been made, the care of the children was in practice committed to the foster parents. The 
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daily lives of the children were not thereafter managed by the authority, as they were if they were 
accommodated in a children’s home, and the practice of the foster parents in relation to their own 
and the fostered children was for them. The foster carers did not do what the authority would 
otherwise do for itself; they did something different, by providing an upbringing as part of a family. 
The children lived in a family; a family life was not consistent with the kind of organisation which the 
enterprise test of vicarious liability contemplated.160 
Furthermore, while the instant case arose in the context of deliberate wrongdoing or abuse, 
vicarious liability was more likely to be generated by complaints of acts or omissions said to have 
been negligent. It was an additional indication against the imposition of vicarious liability that it was 
likely to result in the litigation of family activity which it was undesirable should be ventilated in the 
courts.161 
Lord Hughes concluded his judgment by observing that vicarious liability was strict liability, imposed 
on a party which had been in no sense at fault. It was necessary, and fair and just, when it applied to 
fix liability on someone who undertook an activity, especially a commercial activity, by getting 
someone else integrated into his organisation to do it for him. Employment was the classic example, 
but other situations might be analogous. But the extension of strict liability needed careful 
justification. Once one examined the nature of fostering, its extension to that activity did not seem 
to be either called for or justified, but, rather, fraught with difficulty and contra-indicated.162 
What should we make of these various arguments? The unanimous view taken in Armes rejecting 
the imposition of a non-delegable duty in the case of a child placed by the local authority with foster 
parents certainly is supportable, notwithstanding that the relationship between the authority and 
the child can be characterised as one where the authority has assumed a responsibility to protect 
the child and that an antecedent protective relationship between the defendant and the claimant of 
the kind contemplated by Lord Sumption in Woodland appears to exist. This is because their 
Lordships were satisfied that the imposition of any such duty was necessarily excluded by the terms 
of the statute governing the duties of local authorities towards children in care. It is well established 
that courts will not impose duties of care that tend to operate inconsistently with the requirements 
of statute,163 which principle clearly can cover the question whether a non-delegable duty ought to 
be recognised. 
A question as to the relationship between the imposition of a non-delegable duty and the imposition 
of vicarious liability arguably is raised by Lord Reed’s remark that there could not be any rationale 
for imposing vicarious liability on a defendant where he was directly liable for the harm caused by 
the third party. This might be read as meaning the one excludes the other, but that does not seem to 
be right. In principle the two surely can co-exist where the necessary elements to liability under each 
head both exist on the facts of a particular case.164 Perhaps Lord Reed meant only that there was no 
point in going on to examine vicarious liability if the defendant was directly liable. 
What Armes went on to decide about vicarious liability marks a further step in the seemingly 
relentless expansion of the scope of such liability, at least in English law. Particular criticism can be 
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levelled at the emphasis placed by the majority on the ability of the defendant to pay damages and 
the relevance of insurance. In Cox Lord Reed himself recognised that neither factor was a principled 
justification: the mere possession of wealth was not in itself any ground for imposing liability, and 
employers insured themselves because they were liable rather than the other way round.165 While 
his Lordship did not totally rule them out, in Armes he presented both as routine factors which the 
court should take into account. Such arguments seem to lead to nowhere save the depth of the 
defendant’s pocket. 
As for the application of the other factors drawn from Christian Brothers, the approach taken by Lord 
Hughes is convincing. One of his Lordship’s concerns was that logically there would be vicarious 
liability imposed for torts committed by parents and other family members with whom a child was 
placed. Lord Reed denied this, saying that the parents would not have stood in the same relationship 
with the authority. They would have been carrying on an activity (raising their own child) which was 
much more clearly distinguishable from, and independent of, the child care services carried on by 
the local authority than the care of unrelated children by foster parents recruited for that purpose. 
Yet, even assuming that it is appropriate to impose vicarious liability for foster parents but not real 
parents, his Lordship’s answer does not address Lord Hughes’ core argument that, outside 
residential homes, a local authority does not bring up children. Foster parents, by contrast, do not 
perform the tasks of a local authority but they do bring up children. On this view there is no basis for 
any imposition of vicarious liability. So the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in KLB v British 
Columbia,166 denying that a local authority could be vicariously liable for the torts of foster parents, 
is more persuasive than the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in S v Attorney-General,167 
recognising such liability. 
More generally, the decision in Armes very arguably deprives the test of whether a relationship is 
“akin to employment” of real or substantial content. Standing back a little from the detail of the 
case, it is rather hard to understand how a relationship based on a local authority appointing foster 
parents to carry out all the parental activities involved in raising children, which activities the local 
authority does not itself perform, can be seen to qualify in any realistic sense. We can at least expect 
a continuing flow of litigation exploring other situations where some kind of line will be drawn. The 
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